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Abstract 24 
The interface mechanism in a tsunami early warning system (TEWS) occurs at the point between where regional 25 
tsunami information is received at the country level and before any warning or evacuation orders are 26 
disseminated to the public. Three crucial actions take place during the interface: issuing the warning; 27 
disseminating the warning; and, ordering an evacuation. Using two case studies in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, a 28 
study was undertaken to understand the nature of the interface mechanism and the social, cultural and political 29 
dynamics of its operationalisation. In this paper, a comparative analysis of the two case studies is presented, 30 
focusing on the role of governance, institutions and people in this interface. The nature of governance, 31 
hierarchies and structures influence the interface mechanism and the associated decision-making mechanisms. 32 
The institutions who act as key stakeholders are also shaped by the governance structures and hierarchies within 33 
it. The officers working in the institutions are affected by the political influences within the governance system, 34 
and the efficiency of the institutions are determined by the nature of their human resources. The actions of the 35 
officers and their decisions determine the safety of people who rely on the governance system in the event of a 36 
tsunami.  The communities are also affected by the overall governance structure, the political influences that 37 
exist within the governance structure, and the nature of the institution.  The complex relationships between 38 
governance, institutions and officers that exist in the two countries affect the communities in different ways. 39 
Yet, the manner in which the overall operation of TEWS is formed by these relationships in two countries lead 40 
to a common thread of decisions and actions when operationalising the interface. The results are presented in 41 
a framework that illustrates the complex relationships between governance, institutions, officers and 42 
communities. The framework provides a basis for future research on how the interface of TEWS can be 43 
operationalised to effectively protect communities at risk from tsunami.     44 
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1. Introduction 53 
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (IOT) is recorded as one of the deadliest disasters resulting from a natural hazard 54 
since 1900. As a result, governments and international stakeholders in the region established the Indian ocean 55 
tsunami warning and mitigation system (IOTWMS), which became fully operational in 2013 (UNESCO, 2013).  56 
It was originally understood that there are two main mechanisms within a tsunami early warning system (TEWS), 57 
upstream and downstream (de León, Bogardi, Dannenmann, & Basher, 2006). However, in a recent study, an 58 
interface mechanism between the upstream and downstream was identified, whereby the tsunami warning 59 
decision is taken at the country level, the warning information is disseminated, and an evacuation order is issued 60 
(Sakalasuriya, Amaratunga, Haigh, & Hettige, 2018). There is very limited research that focuses specifically on 61 
the interface mechanism, as it is a relatively new term within the early warning field. They also found there to 62 
be an inadequate understanding of the interface mechanism among policy makers and practitioners in the early 63 
warning sector. The complexity within the interface mechanism and the related technical, social, political and 64 
administrative challenges, offer a narrative that will be useful in both scientific and practical circles. A study was 65 
undertaken to explore and understand the nature of interface mechanism of TEWS, and to offer guidelines to 66 
better its operationalisation. This paper presents the findings of this study as a cross case analysis.  67 
The two countries selected for this study are Indonesia and Sri Lanka, which are both member states of the 68 
common regional warning system, the IOTWMS. Among several countries affected by the 2004 IOT, Indonesia 69 
was the worst hit in terms of deaths and disappearances (NOAA, 2019a). Indonesia continues to be affected by 70 
tsunamis and earthquakes, due to its tectonic setting, and several tsunamis have affected the country since the 71 
2004 IOT (NOAA, 2019b). In contrast, the 2004 IOT is the only tsunami to have impacted Sri Lanka in its recent 72 
history, but the 2004 event resulted in the highest recorded deaths by a single natural hazard in Sri Lanka 73 
(Jayasuriya, Steele, & Weerakoon, 2006). The two countries are different in terms of geographic and 74 
demographic features, and therefore the extent of (de)centralisation of the warning system also differs 75 
considerably. The beginning and end points of tsunami interface mechanisms in the two countries are also 76 
different (Haigh et al., 2020; Rahayu, Haigh, Amaratunga, & Sakalasuriya, 2019). However, both are developing 77 
countries and similar in terms of multilevel administrative structures and have diverse populations with social 78 
and cultural complexities. These different contexts shape the interface operationalisation, while also providing 79 
an opportunity to explore similarities. In this paper, a comparative analysis of the two case studies is presented, 80 
focusing on the role of governance and institutions, and the people within those institutions.  81 
 82 
2. Literature review  83 
2.1. Tsunami early warning system (TEWS)  84 
A TEWS’s main objective is to alert the communities living in exposed coastal areas about the upcoming danger 85 
and provide guidance for evacuation (Cecioni et al., 2014; IOC/UNESCO, 2015). Several institutions that 86 
specialise in technical and managerial aspects of disaster preparedness work together to provide tsunami 87 
information to the public (ISDR, 2004). A speedy and accurate prediction mechanism, strong and consistent 88 
communication, and coherency and reliability, are some of the requirements (Basher, 2006; Cecioni et al., 2014; 89 
Perry & Green, 1982). Typically, a TEWS starts with the detection of an earthquake, goes through the steps of 90 
warning and evacuation, and ends with the safe return of people to their homes (de León et al., 2006). However, 91 
as has been highlighted by recent events in Indonesia, they can also be generated on impact as a rapidly moving 92 
landslide mass enters the water, for example following a volcanic eruption or underwater landslide.  93 
2.2. The interface of the TEWS 94 
The upstream and downstream of warning systems are generally well defined and documented in official 95 
technical documents and previous studies (IOC & UNESCO, 2019; UslÃ, 2015; Wächter et al., 2012). The 96 
upstream mechanism usually starts at the regional level, where an earthquake is detected, and the risk of a 97 
tsunami is forecasted. Once the warning information is received by a national authority, warning information is 98 
processed and disseminated within the country. The downstream mechanism is where the warning information 99 
and evacuation order is disseminated to the relevant authorities and general public, and if necessary, 100 
communities are relocated. Typically, the downstream mechanism continues until the risk of the tsunami is 101 
alleviated (Bernard & Titov, 2015; IOC/UNESCO, 2015). The interface in the context of TEWS is a relatively new 102 
concept and was not well defined in previous research. Recently, it has been identified as the series of actions 103 
that takes place between the upstream and downstream mechanisms. As highlighted in figure 1, there are three 104 
significant action points: issuing the warning, conveying the warning and giving the order of evacuation  105 
(Sakalasuriya et al., 2018). This definition of interface was the underlying supposition used in directing the 106 
research. It was presented and validated at several focus group discussions (FGDs) held throughout the study.   107 
 108 
 109 
Figure 1. The position of interface within the end-to-end TEWS, authors’ composition (Sakalasuriya et al., 2018) 110 
 111 
2.3. Conceptual framework used for the study 112 
Based on the interface definition developed by the authors, a literature review was undertaken in order to 113 
understand the state of the art related to TEWS and establish a basis for data collection and analysis 114 
(Sakalasuriya et al., 2018). This literature review led the authors to construct a conceptual framework that 115 
consists of nine components. This framework was used as the foundation for data collection in both countries, 116 
as well as the analysis and reporting of the results. The nine components in the framework are: Decision-making 117 
mechanism; Clearly defined actors; Centralised vs decentralised approach; Standardisation of interface; 118 
Technical capacity; Human capacity; Spatial and socio-cultural aspects; Vertical and horizontal coordination; and, 119 
Formal and informal communication mechanisms. For this paper, these were further mapped into literature 120 
related to disaster governance and politics, as summarised below.  121 
 122 
2.4. Conceptual framework for interface of TEWS 123 
All crucial action points within interface of TEWS – issuing the warning, conveying the warning and issuing the 124 
order of evacuation – involve decision-making by organisations and individuals (Sakalasuriya et al., 2018). It can 125 
be argued that the other eight concepts within the framework operate at the periphery of the decision-making 126 
mechanism. Governance on the other hand, is how a country or the state manages its resources to meet a 127 
certain objective, and it involves the interactions of stakeholders with each other to make decisions related to 128 
complex processes and outcomes (Cheema, 1997; Renn, 2008; World Bank, 1992). Governance is a key part of 129 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), both at the overarching policy level and within individual warning systems (Ahrens 130 
& Rudolph, 2006). DRR is a holistic, ongoing and systematic process and involves cross-border collaborations 131 
and governance arrangements between international, national and local stakeholders (Fakhruddin & 132 
Chivakidakarn, 2014; Tierney, 2012).  133 
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Van Niekerk (2015) defines disaster risk governance as the manner in which public entities, civil servants, media, 134 
and civil society coordinate, manage and reduce the risk of disasters. Modern disaster governance efforts are 135 
increasingly participatory, and address contracting and outsourcing, and public-private collaboration. These are 136 
replacing hierarchical and bureaucratic approaches (Tierney, 2012).  Disaster risk governance occurs at all stages 137 
of a disaster: preventing, preparing to respond, managing the occurrence, and providing relief and recovery 138 
(Briceño, 2015; Fidler, 2005; Van Niekerk, 2015). The governance methods and structures across these stages 139 
may vary (Tierney, 2012). Early warning fits within the preparedness and management cycles of disaster risk 140 
governance. There are four main elements of early warning: risk knowledge; technical monitoring and warning 141 
service; dissemination and communication of warnings; and response capability and preparedness (UNISDR, 142 
2004). A study by Spahn, Hoppe, Vidiarina, and Usdianto (2010) claims that well-developed governance and 143 
institutional arrangements are the foundations on which the above elements can be achieved. At the same time, 144 
effective disaster governance requires other attributes of good governance such as accountability, 145 
empowerment, deliberation, participation and representation (Lebel et al., 2006).  146 
Disaster governance is built within the overarching governance system that already exists in society (Tierney, 147 
2012). Fakhruddin and Chivakidakarn (2014) add that the disaster governance structure of a country should be 148 
based on the national disaster management institutional structure, and that effective early warning relies on the 149 
policies, laws, institutional frameworks, and the capacities of the officers. For the purpose of this study, the 150 
governance structure/system is defined as the institutional arrangement and hierarchy, legal frameworks and 151 
the political stimuluses that support the establishment and maintenance of TEWS.  152 
The institutional arrangements established to reduce disaster risk and vulnerabilities, and to address the 153 
challenges after a disaster, form a significant part of disaster risk governance, and integrated and multisectoral 154 
disaster risk assessments require committed and knowledgeable institutional stakeholders at all levels (Tierney, 155 
2012). On the other hand, multi-layered and polycentric institutional arrangements are key in developing 156 
disaster risk efforts under good governance (Lebel et al., 2006). It is also necessary to clarify the roles and 157 
responsibilities (Spahn et al., 2010).  158 
The institutions that operate within early warning systems must be specialised in their tasks on identifying, 159 
assessing and managing the disaster risk, and be able to influence the other development stakeholders (Briceño, 160 
2015). At the same time, it is important to maintain resource capacities internally and coordinate with other 161 
stakeholders (Spahn et al., 2010). Sakalasuriya et al. (2018) highlight that vertical and horizontal coordination 162 
among the stakeholders is a key factor that determines the effectiveness of an early warning system. Gaps in 163 
coordination can result in errors and misunderstandings (Haigh et al., 2020; Rahayu et al., 2019). Within an early 164 
warning system, the institutions should build trusting relationships with other stakeholders by understanding 165 
the duties and responsibilities of each other (Samaratunge, Coghill, & Herath, 2008).  166 
According to Ahrens and Rudolph (2006), accountability, participation, predictability and transparency are the 167 
key features of an effective disaster governance structure that supports DRR. Participation is also a key factor 168 
that contributes to building trust and accountability within the governance structure, and ensures equal 169 
distribution of benefits and risks (Lebel et al., 2006). According to Koliba, Mills, and Zia (2011), trust allows people 170 
to take decisions without having complete knowledge or information about the issue on which they are taking 171 
decisions. Trust is usually built through strong written agreements, correct decision-making procedures and 172 
through negotiations. Uhr and Ekman (2008) defines trust as the “relation between a trustor and a trustee where 173 
the expected behaviour and competence of the trustee in a specific context, estimated by the trustor, is a central 174 
core in the concept”. For the purpose of this study, trust is defined by the authors as the ability of the 175 
communities and organisations to promptly follow the guidelines given to them in a tsunami warning situation, 176 
without further questioning the authenticity of the system.  177 
Implementation of effective disaster governance systems and establishment of early warning institutional 178 
arrangements requires strong political leadership and commitment (Spahn et al., 2010). Samaratunge et al. 179 
(2008) claim that political interests and agendas are a key factor that affect the disaster risk governance 180 
framework and its operation. Policy oriented interventions, backed by strong political will and commitment, can 181 
help to grow institutional and community resilience to disasters (Pelling, 2011). In this study, political influence 182 
refers to the actions and decisions taken by national and local level politicians or groups of politicians in power 183 
that affect the TEWS.   184 
Based on the above analysis, the following concepts have been derived to form a conceptual framework 185 
related to governance, institutions and people within the interface of TEWS. These are used as the basis for 186 
analysing the data and reporting the results.  187 
1. Decision making within disaster governance structure  188 
2. Institutional arrangements 189 
a. Hierarchy 190 
b. Functions 191 
c. Standardisation   192 
d. Interinstitutional coordination  193 
e. Human resources 194 
3. Community participation and trust  195 
4. Political influence  196 
 197 
3. Methodology 198 
The conceptual framework mentioned in section 2.3 was used as the underpinning guideline for developing the 199 
data collection and analysis tools for the study. The data collection process was oriented towards gathering 200 
information from both countries to be measured against the conceptual framework. However, semi structured 201 
key informant interviews (KIIs) and FGDs were used as an opportunity to explore beyond the conceptual 202 
framework and allow additional concepts, themes and areas of analysis to be discovered. Sri Lanka and Indonesia 203 
were selected as the two case studies. Three research teams were involved in the study: a coordinating research 204 
team in United Kingdom (UK) and country teams in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, further described in annex 2. The 205 
research design and data collection protocols were subject to the ethical approval procedures of the affiliated 206 
universities of the authors. An FGD was held in each country for validation purposes. Further details of the in-207 
country data collection and validation processes are given in annex 3. Separate reports were prepared based on 208 
the findings in each country.  209 
The cross-case analysis presented in this paper was led by the UK research team, based on the country reports, 210 
and was reviewed by the Indonesian and Sri Lankan partners. The comparative analysis focused on the 211 
governance systems and institutions related to the TEWSs. It was based on the conceptual framework presented 212 
in section 2.4. According to Khan and VanWynsberghe (2008), new research knowledge can be produced by 213 
mobilising and accumulating the case data, and comparing and contrasting the cases. Comparison of case studies 214 
can help the researchers to incite imagination, ask new questions, construct new dimensions and think of 215 
alternative realities (Stretton, 2013). Ragin (2004) and  Khan and VanWynsberghe (2008) suggest two 216 
approaches for carrying out cross-case analysis: variable-oriented and case-oriented. Due to the limited time 217 
frame and differences in research teams, the variable-oriented approach could not be used for the cross-case 218 
analysis in this paper. Thus, the case-oriented cross-case analysis is used to derive the generalisations presented 219 
in this paper, by comparing the commonalities and variances between the two cases.  220 
 221 
4. Results of the cross-case analysis  222 
 223 
4.1. Institutional arrangements  224 
In this section, the nature of the interface institutions in the TEWS are discussed, focusing on their hierarchy, 225 
functions, standardisation and coordination with each other.  226 
4.1.1. The hierarchy  227 
It is revealed through this study that the institutions that operate within a TEWS are established within and 228 
adapted according to the existing governance structure of the country. Their hierarchy, functionality, standards 229 
and relationships to other institutions are shaped by the governance system within which they operate. Within 230 
the interface, the key national and local stakeholders mainly consist of government institutions or individuals 231 
attached to and representing those institutions.  232 
In Sri Lanka (hereafter SL-TEWS), all significant interface institutions operate at national level; namely 233 
Department of Meteorology (DoM), Disaster Management Centre (DMC) and Ministry of Disaster Management 234 
(MDM). On the other hand, in Indonesia (hereafter Ina-TEWS) both national and local stakeholder institutions 235 
make decisions during the interface, including Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics 236 
(BMKG), Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB), Local Disaster Management Organisation 237 
(BPBD), and the local mayor’s office. Within Ina-TEWS, there is clear hierarchy from BMKG as information 238 
provider and decision maker to other actors who disseminate information and issue evacuation orders. In Sri 239 
Lanka, while ministry has the highest constitutional authority, DoM and DMC acts as agencies under ministry 240 
performing critical roles within interface. Although the DoM is directly regulated under the MDM, it is difficult 241 
to determine the line ministry of the DMC, as evidence suggests links to MDM, the Ministry of Defence, as well 242 
as to the Office of the President (DMC, 2020a, 2020b; MDM, 2009, 2019; MOF, 2014).   It is also difficult to 243 
distinguish between DMC and DoM based on hierarchy, as both are national level institutions directly related to 244 
the Ministries, and both play significant roles in disaster warning and management.  245 
 246 
4.1.2. Functions of the institutions  247 
The IOTWMS (IOC/UNESCO, 2019) identifies several key functions at the regional and national levels. The 248 
Tsunami Service Providers (TSPs) of Australia, India and Indonesia work as a “system of systems”, generating 249 
tsunami forecast information products simultaneously to all Indian Ocean coastal areas. The TSPs make tsunami 250 
forecast information products available to the Tsunami Warning Focal Points (TWFPs) of each country, which 251 
operate 24/7. It is the responsibility of the National Tsunami Warning Centre (NTWC), who may also be the 252 
TWFP, to evaluate the tsunami information provided by the TSPs, decide on appropriate national action and 253 
issue tsunami warning instructions to their public. The National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) should 254 
play a key role in taking efficient and immediate actions to ensure public safety before, during, and after the 255 
event. The relevant organisation for each of the above functions for each country are summarised in the table 1 256 
below.  257 
Table 1. Functions of the national institutions within TEWS 258 
Function  Ina-TEWS SL-TEWS 
Regulator  BMKG MDM 
NTWC/TWFP BMKG DoM 
NDMO BNPB DMC 
 259 
4.1.3. Standardisation  260 
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are the guidelines agreed upon by the stakeholders to determine who, 261 
what, when, where and how (United Nations ESCAP, accessed in 2018). In Sri Lanka, SOPs are prepared by 262 
institutions such as MDM, DMC and DoM for their internal use. Some general guidelines on early warning and 263 
emergency response situations are available in the National emergency operation plan (NEOP) which is prepared 264 
by the DMC (DMC, 2015). However, it was evident from the interviews and desk study that SOPs of different 265 
institutions are not formally integrated. The absence of a common guideline that can be followed by all 266 
stakeholders have created a lack of understanding among the individuals within the institutions, which was 267 
demonstrated during the FGD conducted during the data collection stage. For example, officers from DoM and 268 
DMC had disputes regarding ‘who contacts the regional TSP and the ministry’ and ‘who takes the final warning 269 
decision’. Both claimed these responsibilities. Ministry representatives were also not able to clarify.  It became 270 
evident that the communication mechanism among these officers was based on personal relationships. After 271 
the initial analysis stages of this study, an integrated SOP was developed by the key stakeholders.  This integrated 272 
SOP was tested during the 2018 Indian ocean-wide tsunami (IOWave) exercise, and was further improved and 273 
later adopted (Amaratunga, Haigh, & Dias 2019; Haigh & Amaratunga, 2018).  274 
The Service Guidebook for Ina-TEWS is the principal document prepared to guide all the stakeholders within the 275 
Ina-TEWS. This includes guidance for national and local stakeholders, the public and private sectors (BMKG, 276 
2012). In addition, there are guidelines available within the individual institutions, both at national and local 277 
levels. It was revealed that the guidelines can be specific to local circumstances. However, several gaps were 278 
identified. For example, the roles of BNBP, EOC and BPBD were not specified as key warning conveyors and 279 
decision-makers in the regulations. In practise their roles are significant in terms of information dissemination 280 
and in activating local evacuation orders. There are also gaps in the clarity of the guidelines given in the service 281 
guidebook. For example, under the regulations, the primary role of EOC, BNPB and BPBD is described as 282 
activating the relief funds, and their role within warning and evacuation are not highlighted. In practise these 283 
three institutions play a significant role in disseminating warning and evacuation information.  284 
4.1.4. Inter-institutional coordination  285 
The interface institutions are crucial stakeholders that contribute to the effective operation of the TEWS. In Sri 286 
Lanka, DoM is required to collaborate with DMC, GSMB and NARA. However, the DoM does not recognise the 287 
need to formally liaise with the GSMB, as the GSMB can only provide earthquake information and not tsunami 288 
updates. At the same time, NARA can only provide sea level monitoring services, and their information is not 289 
adequate for advanced tsunami risk identification. Due to the lack of coordination among the institutions and 290 
absence of a synergised SOP, misunderstandings have occurred among the stakeholders. 291 
In Indonesia, coordination among the national actors was described as adequate and effective by the interview 292 
participants. For example, there is internal horizontal coordination and communication among divisions in BNPB; 293 
i.e. EOC, PUSDATIN (Data and Information Centre) and PASTIGANA (Center For Disaster Alert Situation Analysis). 294 
In an early warning situation, EOC provides situation information to the board of director, PUSDATIN and 295 
PASTIGANA. Through press conferences and press release, PUSDATIN of BNPB gives clear information about a 296 
disaster event and its impacts to mass media and public community. Meanwhile PASTIGANA make situation 297 
analysis reports using maps and graphic information. However, problems were identified in terms of 298 
coordination between national and local actors, as well as among the different local stakeholders within the city 299 
or region. The coordination between BNPB and BPBD was found to be inadequate, due to the misunderstandings 300 
of the warning command chain. At the same time, the different local BPBDs were found to have their own 301 
mechanisms and guidelines for giving the order of evacuation, resulting in discrepancies between local 302 
evacuation efforts.  303 
4.2. Decision making within the governance structure  304 
The main tasks that take place within the interface of TEWS are issuing the warning, conveying the warning and 305 
issuing the order of evacuation. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the interface starts once the warning from 306 
regional TSPs is received at the national level. The crucial decisions of issuing the official tsunami warning and 307 
order for evacuation take place either at the national or the local level based on the country situation.  308 
4.2.1. Issuing the warning  309 
The information received from other TSPs is processed within BMKG to determine the level of tsunami risk, and 310 
the decision to issue the warning is taken by the BMKG (a detailed explanation of decision making within BMKG 311 
is given in annex 3).  The warnings are issued at the national level at this point, both by BMKG and BNPB. The 312 
decision to issue the warning typically takes place within five minutes of receiving regional information.   313 
In the case of Sri Lanka, the earthquake and tsunami information are received by DoM. However, unlike 314 
Indonesia, the national level tsunami impact is not evaluated at the country level in Sri Lanka due to limited 315 
capabilities, but they maintain the links with technical institutions to determine changes in the tsunami threat 316 
level. The decision to issue the tsunami warning is taken by DoM based on the technical information they receive. 317 
The criteria for taking this decision is further explained in annex 4.  318 
 319 
4.2.1. Conveying the warning  320 
In Indonesia, once BMKG decides to issue a tsunami warning, the national level warnings and guidance for 321 
evacuation are issued by the BNPB, the national disaster management agency.   The warning and evacuation 322 
information is communicated to all the national and local level interface institutions. At the national level this 323 
includes Ministry of Home Affairs, police and military, and Ministry of Communication, Information and 324 
Technology. The warning and evacuation information is also disseminated to local level governments and local 325 
disaster management centres.  The dissemination of warning and ordering for evacuation at local level may take 326 
different durations based on local circumstances. The warning information and evacuation guidance are also 327 
broadcast through television and radio networks, and the official social media channels of BMKG and BNPB.  328 
In SL-TEWS, DoM sends the tsunami bulletins to DMC, who then communicates the warnings, and if appropriate, 329 
evacuation orders to all the other national and local stakeholders. According to the information revealed 330 
through the FGD in Sri Lanka, the process of determining the tsunami threat, disseminating to the DMC and 331 
deciding on order of evacuation takes place within less than half an hour. This mainly takes place through 332 
telephone or mobile conversations. While the official warning chain takes place between the regional TSP, DoM 333 
and DMC, it is the responsibility of the DMC to inform the Ministry of the potential threat of tsunami through 334 
which the relevant minister and the president are also kept in the communication chain. It was revealed at the 335 
FGD that the Director General of DMC directly informs the Secretary or an Additional Secretary of the Ministry 336 
through telephone about the risk. The interface institutions and the ministry maintain personal contacts with 337 
each other until the tsunami threat is alleviated.  338 
 339 
4.2.2. Issuing the evacuation order 340 
In Indonesia, the local governments are bestowed with the responsibility of issuing the evacuation order at 341 
regional and city levels. Mayors have the official responsibility of announcing the order for evacuation. During 342 
the study it was revealed that the mayors are given clear guidelines on issuing evacuation orders and supported 343 
by the local level trained officers who have more knowledge. At the same time, there are alternative 344 
arrangements to take decisions by local EOCs or BMKG in case the mayor is absent.  345 
In Sri Lanka, evacuation decisions are taken by the DMC on behalf of the MDM and the government. The 346 
evacuation orders are transferred to the national media and local governments for action. In contrast to 347 
Indonesia, the interface warning and evacuation chain in Sri Lanka is contained within the national level. The 348 
evacuation orders are issued through the national television and radio networks, as well as through official social 349 
media accounts of interface institutions.  350 
A common factor within the interface of both countries is that political actors maintain a high influence in the 351 
decision-making mechanism. The MDM in Sri Lanka needs to agree with the warning and evacuation decisions 352 
before they are disseminated. The local mayors in Indonesia are issuing the official evacuation orders at regional 353 
and city levels. A main difference between the two countries is the decentralisation of interface mechanism in 354 
Indonesia. Although decentralisation of disaster governance has sometimes been advocated, it is not advisable 355 
to do so in the absence of adequate capacity (see section 2.4). The large physical land area and approximately 356 
6,000 populated islands, as well as a decentralised government structure, provides a rationale for having local 357 
decision-making mechanisms in Indonesia. However, the involvement of local level governance within Ina-TEWS 358 
requires rapid action and decision making, and is often criticised in previous studies (Chatfield & Brajawidagda, 359 
2013; Seng, 2013; Spahn et al., 2010). During the tsunami event caused by 2018 Sulawesi earthquake, it was 360 
reported in the media that local authorities did not have adequate time to enact the local orders, and there was 361 
a large human death toll (BBC, 2018). Efficiency and speed are significant in the case of Ina-TEWS due to the 362 
nearfield threat faced by some communities. This raises questions over the decision to mandate local 363 
governments with the responsibility for issuing evacuation orders, but is, at least in part, a legacy of the decision 364 
in 2000 to decentralise government to regencies and municipalities.  365 
 366 
4.3. Human resources - People within the institutions  367 
Two major individuals involved in the interface of SL-TEWS are the Minister and the Secretary to the Minister. 368 
In case of an emergency and warning issuance, both DMC and DoM inform the secretary about the changing 369 
developments, who then updates the Minister. Being a political representative and a member of the cabinet, 370 
the Minister also keeps the president and other relevant minsters informed about the situation. As the national 371 
disaster management institution, the individuals in DMC are under direct scrutiny and well-connected to political 372 
actors. However, gaps were identified in relation to human capacity in some of the interface institutions. For 373 
example, NARA is not able to maintain and deliver sea level data to DoM as it does not operate 24/7.  374 
DoM faces issues with its human resources due to the heavy workload and staff being stretched into several 375 
responsibilities. Some individuals in the disaster management sector of Sri Lanka have also developed a 376 
passiveness towards a potential tsunami. Some of the officers who participated in interviews and FGD displayed 377 
a lack of knowledge of the up-to-date procedures and international bulletins. The officers who participated in 378 
official region-wide training provided for member states of IOTWMS have failed to report their learnings and 379 
updated information back to their institutions. For example, at the March 2018 FGD it was revealed that the 380 
tsunami bulletins practised within SL-TEWS have not been updated according to international standards since 381 
2012.  382 
The director general of BMKG, Indonesia, is the head of BMKG. An inspector and a main secretary are two main 383 
leads under the director general, and the rest of the staff function under their guidance. Like DMC in Sri Lanka, 384 
BNPB is under the direct supervision of the president of the republic of Indonesia, and there are several 385 
secretaries and deputy heads that function under the head of the BNPB. However, the roles played by individuals 386 
within Ina-TEWS institutions tend to adapt and change depending on the situational circumstances. For example, 387 
in the March 2016 event, BNPB did not have a critical position in the tsunami early warning sequences, but 388 
rather on the emergency response with the EOCs in activating the emergency fund (Coordinator and Joint Event 389 
Assessment Team, 2017). Limitations in human capacity were also identified in relation to interpreting 390 
information on tsunami warning and using equipment and tools (FGD and documentary evidence). Some local 391 
level actors failed to activate the warnings during tsunami events due to a lack of understanding of the warning 392 
bulletins, and the corresponding procedures for actions. The local mayor is a key individual within the local 393 
operation of Ina-TEWS. Since the mayor is a political actor, EOC specialists are essential in supporting the mayor 394 
and these personnel require training and effective leadership skills to determine an evacuation order in the 395 
absence of the mayor. Despite these concerns, training, knowledge of bulletins and standards were maintained 396 
and updated according to international standards. This pro-active approach, in contrast to Sri Lanka, is likely due 397 
to the more recent experiences of tsunami, and the higher levels of tsunami exposure and frequency. 398 
4.4. Community participation and trust 399 
The ultimate objective of a TEWS is to take people to safety during the tsunami inundation (IOC/UNESCO, 2015). 400 
It is important to maintain a positive relationship between the TEWS governance structure and the communities. 401 
The institutions in both countries have recognised the importance of raising community awareness and 402 
education through preparedness activities, drills and simulation exercises. The region wide IOWave tsunami 403 
exercises are carried out once every two years and additional education programmes are implemented by DMC 404 
in Sri Lanka and BMKG in Indonesia (desk study and interviews). Since Sri Lanka has not faced a tsunami since 405 
the establishment of the SL-TEWS, the only measure of community response considered for this study are the 406 
drills and simulation exercises.  It was revealed during the FGD in Sri Lanka, that the community issues that arise 407 
during the simulation exercises were rarely reported to the top level, making it difficult to update the evacuation 408 
procedures. The observation report from 2018 IOWave exercise suggests that there is a need to improve 409 
community participation in more areas, as well as include participation of vulnerable communities in the 410 
evacuation drills (Amaratunga et al., 2019).  Unlike Sri Lanka, Indonesia has faced several tsunami events since 411 
the establishments of Ina-TEWS, allowing lessons to be learnt. According to the results of the desk study, the 412 
community deaths in 2012 and 2016 tsunamis were caused by technical and/or human errors in the systems 413 
rather than a lack of community preparedness. The destruction caused by the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake was 414 
also due to unpredicted rapidity of the tsunami impact (Heidarzadeh, Muhari, & Wijanarto, 2019), rather than 415 
weaknesses in community preparedness.  416 
At the same time, the trustworthiness and credibility of the government and the government institutions affect 417 
the emergency response of the community (Uhr & Ekman, 2008; Wray, Rivers, Jupka, & Clements, 2006). The 418 
historical experiences of misinformation have led people to panic in the absence of tsunamis in both countries, 419 
as well as not evacuate in actual tsunami events in Indonesia. For example, a false warning was issued in Sri 420 
Lanka on 11 April 2012 causing people to panic and lives were lost due to road accidents.  During the 2018 421 
Sulawesi tsunami, there was no official tsunami warning delivered to the people due to technical failures, causing 422 
large scale loss of lives and destruction (Harnantyari et al., 2020). This emphasises not only the responsibility of 423 
the government to improve technical accuracy, but also the need for institutions to work with the communities 424 
at risk and the local leaders to raise awareness.  425 
 426 
4.5. Political influence  427 
The involvement of political actors is understood to be an issue in both cases, but at different levels.  As discussed 428 
in 4.2.2, assigning the responsibility for activating an evacuation order to a local political actor, who is also not 429 
a specialist in any warning procedures, can be problematic. This delegation of authority is due to a much wider 430 
decision to decentralise government and give greater authority, political power to regencies and municipalities, 431 
rather than to optimise early warning. While it is important to involve public figures in TEWSs to increase 432 
community preparedness, it has the potential to cause errors within the warning chain, where promptness of 433 
delivery and accuracy of information are critical.   434 
Along with active participation of officers, political leadership and willingness are also necessary to reverse this 435 
trend and increase awareness and attentiveness among vulnerable communities. Political interventions in 436 
government institutions – appointments, transfers and personal relationships – can also be related to the 437 
passiveness of the officers. The transferring of trained staff in DMC and DoM to other government institutions 438 
was found to be problematic, as the training underwent by the transferred staff is wasted and the newly 439 
recruited personnel must be trained again to fit the requirements of the institutions. The political involvement 440 
in appointments and transfers of the government sector employees is a common issue in Sri Lanka (Höglund & 441 
Piyarathne, 2009; McCourt, 2000, 2007). However, when those influences take place in key sectors like disaster 442 
management, the safety the public will be ultimately at risk. This can also result in the institutions being run by 443 
unskilled and apathetic officials. It is necessary to allow the management of human resources within interface 444 
institutions to take place without political intervention, and based on merit, specialisation and skills.   Rather 445 
than influencing the inside mechanisms of the institutions, the politicians have a wider role to play in terms of 446 
representing the interests of the community within the government as well as bringing the crucial messages of 447 
the government to the community.  448 
 449 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  450 
The findings of this study suggest that the complex relationships within the governance structure – the decision-451 
making mechanism, institutional arrangements and political influence – can have a profound influence on the 452 
community responses in a TEWS. The interface is an important stage within the early warning process, as the 453 
rapidity and accuracy of decision-making and information dissemination determine the safety of the 454 
communities.  455 
Table 2 is a summary of the findings and gaps (gaps are in highlighted text), and a set of recommendations that 456 
can be adopted to address the gaps. These were presented to the relevant agencies in each country. 457 
Table 2 - Summary of findings/gaps and recommendations  458 
Concept  Indonesia Sri Lanka Recommendations 
Decision making  Local mayor issuing the 
evacuation order  
 
Partially decentralised  
Personal contact with 




Clear guideline to political 
actors on decision making  
 
Providing technical 
stakeholders with SOPs 




BMKG is the regulator and 
the warning provider 
 
Clear hierarchy at national 
and local levels 
Absence of hierarchy 
between DoM and DMC 
 
Overarching authority of 
MDM 
 
Functions of the 
institutions 
Different practices at local 
level  
 
A political actor; local 
government, is involved in 
key task of issuing order 
of evacuation  
Both DMC and DoM 
engage in warning 
dissemination  
 
Both DMC and DoM 
maintains contacts with 
external service providers 
Specify roles of each 
institution  
 
Minimise discrepancies in 
practices among same-
level institutions 




Absence of an integrated 
SOP for all stakeholders 
Establish SOPs within 





BNPB and BPBD 
 




between DoM and NARA, 
GSMB not taking place 
due to lack of capacity  
Increase capacity and 
tools for coordination  
 





Changing roles according 
to circumstances  
 
Misinterpretations of 
bulletins and SOPs 
 
Inadequate training and 
capacity at local level 
High individual 
involvement of ministry 
level actors 
 
Lack of capacity in 
training, specialisation 
and numbers  
 
Transfers and new 
appointments  
 
Lack of knowledge and 
passive behaviour  
Clearly identify roles of 
each officer within the 
institutions 
 
Mandate to appoint and 
retain trained and 
specialised staff 
 









Misinformation/ lack of 
communication causing 
deaths and affecting trust  
SL-TEWS has never been 
subject to an actual 
tsunami 
 
False warnings affecting 
trust 
 
Lack of feedback from 
drills and simulation 






indifference   
Improve TEWS through 
research/ development  
 
Establish alternative 
means of communication 
in the failure of main 
warning chain  
 
Establish clear mechanism 








Local mayor is not an 
expert in the field  
 
 
Political influence on 
transfers/appointments 
within institutions  
 
Lack of pollical vigilance 
to potential tsunami 
threat 
Minimise political 
influence within the 
institutions  
 
Technical and field 
experts without political 
influence 
 
Political leadership to 
increase awareness  
 
Use political influence to 
increase funding, improve 
capacities  
 459 
Based on the analysis presented in this paper, a framework was been developed to summarise the findings of 460 
the paper (figure 4). This framework highlights the relationships between governance, institutions, officers and 461 
communities within the interface of TEWS, and was developed to reflect the learnings from the two case studies.  462 
The TEWS is established within the existing governance structure, and the interface is a mechanism that takes 463 
place within the TEWS that involves three key actions: issuing the warning, conveying the warning and ordering 464 
for evacuation. The institutions pertaining to interface of TEWS are operating under the legal and administrative 465 
frameworks provided under the governance system.  466 
Depending on the nature of existing governance structure, the interface can either be centrally operating at a 467 
national level or decentralised to national and local level institutions. The hierarchy, functions, level of 468 
standardisation and the inter-institutional coordination determine the effectiveness of these interface 469 
institutions. The roles and functions of institutions are mainly those related to policy making, regulating, taking 470 
warning decisions, disseminating the warning information, and giving and disseminating evacuation orders. The 471 
institutions can contribute to the interface in one or more areas of specialisation including technical, managerial, 472 
communication and facilitation. Officers within institutions are key in their successful operation.  473 
While the officers are bound to work within the legal frameworks and regulations provided under the 474 
governance system, personal relationships to individual actors within the government structure are also 475 
important within the context of TEWS and can affect the maintenance of standards. On the other hand, the 476 
political actors within the governance system have a direct influence on the institutional operations as well as 477 
on the actions of the officers. Communities at risk are directly affected by the actions of officers, institutional 478 
operations as well as decisions of individuals within the government. The community response to TEWS is 479 
formed through preparedness, participation and education. These can be developed under the guidance of the 480 
governance system and using the resources within the institutions. The communities relate back to the 481 
governance system based on their past experiences of safety during the disasters and authenticity of the 482 
information provided the TEWS.  For the governments to continue providing safety to the public, it is important 483 
that communities can trust the TEWS and the related governance system, and that they can rely on the 484 
information provided by the institutions.  485 
 486 
 487 
  488 
Figure 2. The framework on relationships between governance, institutions and community within the interface 489 
of the TEWS (Authors’ composition)  490 
 491 
The framework presented in figure 4 is at its conceptual stage, as it was developed specifically using the analysis of 492 
this paper and based on the findings from Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Future research is required to further validate it 493 
and explore its applicability in different technical, social, political and administrative contexts. A more broadly tested 494 
framework could be used as a guideline for better understanding complexity within the interface mechanism and 495 
overcoming related governance challenges in TEWS.   496 
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